Introduction
Over the last decade, Latin American economies have witnessed sustained economic growth -boosted partially by the commodities boom and vast foreign capital inflows-and a general improvement in their economic policy frameworks. These developments, to some extent, supported the region, helping it come through the global financial and economic crisis successfully. In particular, some countries were able to rid themselves of the burdens that constrained economic policy management in the past (i.e. the "original sin" and the "fear of floating") and apply countercyclical policy measures during the shock. Notwithstanding this progress, Latin America still exhibits important structural impediments to increases in growth potential, as the low rate of productivity growth in most countries testifies.
Brazil is a remarkable example of such improvements and limitations and constitutes a natural case study. Macroeconomic policy in Brazil underwent significant change in the late 1990s. Inflation targeting was introduced as the monetary policy framework in 1999, replacing the previous framework of the Plano Real, which had been designed as an exchange rate mechanism for stabilising inflation. The new inflation targeting regime was accompanied by a de jure commitment to exchange rate flexibility. 1 In addition, a new fiscal policy framework was set up in 2000 with the Fiscal Responsibility Law, aimed at imposing discipline on public finances at all levels of administration (central government, states and municipalities). The Law contributed to an improvement in fiscal accounts and helped sustain net debt dynamics, although it was not a structural rule and did not prevent structural surplus/deficit.
However, the Brazilian economy had very specific features which constrained this apparently state-of-the-art macroeconomic framework. Two features, in particular, stand out: public debt composition and the structure of the banking system. This paper discusses how macroeconomic policies were restricted by those factors and how they have evolved differently. The public debt structure imposed significant limitations on macroeconomic policies during the 2000s. Its main vulnerabilities were indexation, shortterm maturities and short US dollar positions. Nevertheless, these vulnerabilities were gradually overcome during that period and the composition of public debt has remained stable in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. By contrast, the structure of the banking system, characterised by credit segmentation and high interest spreads, remains unchanged. All these features constitute key elements in understanding current macroeconomic developments and credit dynamics.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how monetary and fiscal policies were constrained for a long period of time by the structure of public debt.
Traditionally, internal debt was characterised by short-term maturities and widespread indexation. Even if internal debt dollarisation was not high for regional standards, the public sector had a short US dollar position, i.e. external debt was higher than the holdings of international reserves. Those features were a significant source of vulnerability and constrained the monetary policy framework. Monetary policy tightening implied, as a byproduct, an increase in public debt funding costs, while exchange rate depreciations, otherwise a channel for dampening negative external shocks, could become contractive, on account of impaired debt dynamics due to the currency mismatch between FX assets and 1. See Bogdanski et al. (2000) and (2001) for a detailed description of the inflation targeting regime that replaced the exchange rate mechanism for stabilising inflation under the Plano Real.
liabilities. Therefore, overcoming these constraints was a key prerequisite for conducting countercyclical macroeconomic policies.
Section 3 discusses how the banking system had, and indeed still has, a number of features which have imposed stringent limitations on standard macroeconomic policy. One of the most defining issues is the segmentation of credit allocation: only a fraction of credit is non-earmarked, i.e. freely allocated by banks. The rest is earmarked by a complex system in which the large public development bank Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) has a prominent role. Earmarked credit implies channelling savings to certain sectors where credit provision is supposedly lacking due to market failures. However, beyond a given point, this system implies a crowding out of the private banking system. The high banking spreads between the lending and deposit rates of non-earmarked credit are another key issue. Banking spreads depend on a number of factors, including large compulsory and unremunerated reserve requirements, but also the burden imposed by the earmarking system. Considering these features of the banking system, we assess the room for Additionally, Brazil's banking system has conditioned the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The short-term interest rate, which is the standard monetary policy tool, has little impact on the dynamics of earmarked credit. In turn, the earmarked credit interest rate is linked to the "official" long-term interest rate fixed by the National
Monetary Council. Moreover, earmarked credit may be stimulated by administrative measures and the direct allocation of resources by BNDES, areas of decision-making which lie beyond the scope of the central bank. Finally, the central bank has ample room for conducting quantitative monetary policy, e.g. tightening reserve requirements, with a strong impact on non-earmarked lending rates. Indeed, quasi-fiscal expansions related to public credit policies are also essential to assess the fiscal policy stance. In this sense, the credit expansion of recent years is directly related to policies aimed at stimulating housing and long-term investment.
Finally, Section 4 presents the main conclusions.
Inflation targeting and public debt composition
Public debt had important vulnerabilities in the early 2000s, which imposed significant constraints on macroeconomic policies. These vulnerabilities stemmed from the composition of public debt, rather than from its volume. In fact, the ratio of public debt to GDP was relatively low by international standards, amounting to 52% of GDP in 1999. 2 Debt composition improved gradually during the following decade and its main vulnerabilities were overcome. Such improvements were instrumental to Brazil withstanding the financial shock during the global financial crisis, and the composition of public debt has remained stable ever since.
Public debt structure as a constraint on macroeconomic policy in the 2000s
The composition of public debt was an important source of vulnerability in Brazil in the early 2000s for two reasons. First, a significant fraction of internal debt was exposed to rollover risks, since it was indexed to short-term interest rates or had a short maturity. 3 This is apparent in Table 1 , which disaggregates debt across maturities and instruments. The bias towards short-term maturities was particularly significant for fixed interest rate debt: all fixed interest rate debt matured in less than one year. Debt at longer maturities was fixed at floating interest rates or indexed to inflation. Internal debt was biased towards short-term maturities:
55% of total debt matured in less than one year and public debt over five years accounted for only 14.9% of total debt. Moreover, fixed interest rate debt represented only 9% of total debt, the rest being indexed either to short-term interest rates, inflation or the foreign exchange rate. The public debt structure was a consequence of decades of high inflation, when indexation and shortening of maturities protected the real value of savings from inflation.
2. Internal (domestic) debt represented 38% of GDP while external (international) debt accounted for 14% of GDP. Internal or domestic debt refers to debt issued in Brazil. External or international debt refers to debt issued abroad. 3. Bevilaqua and García (1999) discuss how the prominent role of domestic banks as investors in public debt contributed to mitigate these risks somewhat. A: As % GDP Less than one year 1 yr < x < 2 yr 2 yr < x < 3 yr 3 yr < x < 4 yr 4 yr < x < 5 yr x > 5 yr Total 
B: As % Total Debt
Less than one year 1 yr < x < 2 yr 2 yr < x < 3 yr 3 yr < x < 4 yr 4 yr < x < 5 yr x > 5 yr Total Second, the public sector was a net debtor in foreign currency and therefore exchange rate depreciations had a potential negative impact on debt dynamics. Although financial dollarisation was not as widespread as in other countries of the region, debt exposed to exchange rate fluctuations -the total amount of internal debt and external debt indexed to exchange rates-reached 20% of GDP in 2000. So large was it that it surpassed the low holdings of international reserves.
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The macroeconomic framework introduced at the end of the Plano Real, based on inflation targeting and exchange rate flexibility, was limited by this public debt structure.
Inflation targeting was constrained by widespread debt indexation, since public debt was prominently short-term and indexed to interest rates. Then, as a by-product, monetary policy tightening implied an increase in debt service. Furthermore, exchange rate flexibility was restricted by the public sector net debtor position in foreign currency. Exchange rate depreciations had negative valuation effects and an adverse impact on public debt dynamics, so exchange rates could not float freely to dampen external shocks without impairing public debt. In a nutshell, macroeconomic policies aimed at mitigating inflationary pressures or absorbing negative shocks could lead to very adverse net debt dynamics.
As for the composition of external debt, the bulk was contractual debt, i.e. debt with international financial institutions (IMF, BID and Paris Club) and restructured debt (Brady bonds). Sovereign debt issuance had increased after the introduction of the Plano Real, although access to external markets remained precarious.
Moreover, the structure of public debt could worsen quickly during financial stress, as happened in 2002. Then, political uncertainty during the run-up to the presidential elections triggered a reversal of foreign capital inflows, a significant increase in sovereign debt spreads and a sharp exchange rate depreciation. The problems were aggravated by the gradual shortening of maturities and the reduction in fixed interest debt (see Chart 1).
The central bank tightened monetary policy in response to these developments, although it failed to prevent the marked exchange rate depreciation, which had significant negative balance sheet effects. Moreover, interest rate payments rocketed as monetary policy 4. During the years of high inflation, Brazilian banks used to offer domestic currency deposits, perfectly indexed, as a way of preserving the real value of savings, investing the proceeds in indexed domestic currency bonds. See Goldfajn et al. (2003) , Garcia (1996) , or Bevilaqua and Garcia (2012) . tightening implied an increase in funding costs. Therefore, the ratio of net debt to GDP increased in 2002 by 8.4 pp, in spite of the primary surplus posted by the public sector: a negative valuation effect implied an increase in debt of 9.9 pp of GDP, while interest payments amounted to 7.7 pp of GDP.
Financial instability eased after October, and the exchange rate appreciated, contributing to the stabilisation of net debt dynamics. However, interest payments remained high and the worsening of the public debt structure continued. 5 The 2002 episode was a relevant test for the inflation targeting regime and underscored the importance of addressing public debt vulnerabilities. Overcoming those problems was essential to improving macroeconomic stability and it gradually became a policy priority for the economic authorities.
Improvements in public debt composition
Public debt composition experienced two remarkable improvements in the period 2003-07.
The first was the shift in the composition of the gross public debt structure, which started as far back as 1999. Chart 2 plots the percentage of short-term debt along the vertical (y) axis, while the percentage of fixed interest rate debt is indicated by the horizontal (x) axis. Shortterm debt and indexed debt decreased gradually and, consequently, so did the rollover risk.
The amount of floating interest rate debt halved during this period, with a significant increase in fixed interest debt. Debt maturities lengthened on account of a reduction in short-term debt and a gradual increase in long-term debt.
The second change was the dedollarisation of public debt during that period. The public sector's foreign currency position gradually improved until it became a net creditor.
This change was driven by a reduction in foreign currency debt and also by a significant increase in the central bank's international reserves. The first was a consequence of active debt management by authorities, which moved towards local currency debt in an attempt to 
CHART 3. DEDOLLARISATON OF PUBLIC DEBT. FX ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
Source: BCB, Tesouro Nacional. Note: The chart shows the dedollarisation of public debt. Foreign currency debt includes internal and external debt in foreign currency. Foreign currency assets include international reserves, with a negative sign. Net foreign currency debt is defined as the difference between foreign currency liabilities and assets. 
BOX 1. DEBT MANAGEMENT IN BRAZIL
In this box we review the active Treasury debt management strategy to improve internal and external debt composition.
Internal debt management. The internal debt structure was characterised by shortterm maturities and widespread indexation to floating interest rates and inflation. The
Treasury´s long-term goal was the reduction in financing costs in the long term, subject to acceptable levels of rollover and market and operational risks. The Treasury established a number of intermediate objectives: i) the lengthening of the average maturity; ii) the improvement of maturity profiles, with a particular focus on short-term debt; iii) the gradual increase in fixed interest rate debt or debt indexed to inflation, and a reduction of debt at floating interest rates; and iv) the development of a term structure for public debt. Since
the Treasury has published an annual financing plan (Plano Anual do Financiamento).
The Treasury estimated an optimal debt structure model (Treasury, 2013), in which it establishes ceilings and floors on the different debt instruments for 2013. For instance, fixed income debt should amount to between 41% and 45% of total internal debt; debt indexed to inflation should fluctuate between 34% and 37%; debt at floating interest rates should range between 14% and 19%; and, finally, debt indexed to the exchange rate should stand between 3% and 5% of total debt. This optimal debt composition is considered a medium-term benchmark and should take into account debt maturities. In the long term, the Federal Public Debt (FPD) Profile is defined by indicators with tolerance margins of +/-2%. For instance, fixed rate debt and inflation linked debt should amount to 45% and 35% of total debt respectively, whereas floating rate debt and exchange rate debt should account for 15% and 5%, respectively. There is also a limit of 20% for bonds maturing in 12 months. The internal debt structure moved towards this profile over the period, as Chart 1 shows. Indeed, the proportion of inflation and exchange linked FPD has already reached the proposed limits.
External debt management. In the mid-1990s, external debt comprised a) All in all, the public debt structure changed dramatically during the period: internal debt shifted closer to the optimal debt structure, given the desired combination of return risk, while external debt registered a reduction of restructured debt, a gradual increase in sovereign debt and other qualitative improvements.
Macroeconomic policy during financial shocks: the importance of the public debt structure
The global economic and financial crisis of 2008 had a strong impact on the Brazilian economy through a contraction in external demand and disruptions in financial markets. t-12 t-10 t-8 t-6 t-4 t-2 t t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10t+12
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Real/Dollar sub-sections we discuss the main characteristics of the banking system in more detail, tracking its development over the previous decade, and conclude with a discussion of the main implications of its characteristics for macroeconomic policy.
Segmentation of credit
The Brazilian banking system has traditionally been characterised by the existence of different types of institutions (see Figure 1) . Most of the banks are commercial, either public or private.
They are deposit-taking institutions, engaged in credit provision at market interest rates, but they are also subject to important restrictions and provide earmarked credit to customers under specific programmes. There is also a large, public, development bank, BNDES, which was set up to foster investment projects and expedite the internationalisation of Brazilian firms through long-term loans at subsidised interest rates subject to a number of administrative restrictions and guidelines. This sort of funding is a prototype of what is known as earmarked credit. BNDES may operate both as a first-tier lender, directly involved in credit operations, or as a second-tier lender, directing funds to commercial banks. Credit allocation is, therefore, segmented, between earmarked and non-earmarked credit.
Another feature of the banking system is its concentration. In 2012 around 130 institutions held 98% of the banking system's total assets, but the six largest banks accounted for 77% of its total assets and 78% of its total deposits. Of these six banks, three are public institutions holding 41% of the banking system's total assets and 45% of its total deposits: two commercial public banks, Banco do Brasil and Caixa Economica Federal (the latter being the main mortgage lender with a 75% mortgage market share), and one development bank, BNDES.
The size of the Brazilian banking system substantially increased after the rapid credit expansion of the past decade. In 2001 loans to the non-financial private sector amounted to only 27.5% of GDP (see the two panels in Chart 6). Commercial banks accounted for the bulk of the banking system with 80% of total loans (22% of GDP). In terms of ownership, private institutions made up 59% of the total banking sector (16% of GDP), whereas public banks had a strong presence in the system with a share of 41% of all loans (11% of GDP). It is worth noting that the share of public banks in the system shows a negative correlation with the economic cycle, increasing during the economic crises of the 1980s, 1990s and the latest one. Furthermore, a significant number of borrowers are low income individuals with no credit history, leading to fears of a sub-prime crisis. However, as suggested by Pereira and Harris (2012), the upswing in housing markets in Brazil is better explained by other factors, which include regulatory and legal changes aimed at making housing more affordable. Given the current shortage of available housing and the increasing wealth of the country, public housing programmes are unlikely to give rise to such problems in the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, despite rapid mortgage growth, the stock of mortgage credit is still low (6% of GDP in 2012) and does not compromise households' ability to pay (see Chart 9, Panel B); banks are well capitalised to overcome possible eventualities. For the time being, the ratio of troublesome to total loans remains at manageable levels, and credit portfolio losses are currently over-covered by banks' loan-loss provisions.
Large banking spreads
The large spreads between the interest rates applied to (non-earmarked) loans and those paid on deposits are the second defining feature of the Brazilian banking system. Traditionally, high banking spreads (and consequently, high interest rates on loans) have been an important obstacle to credit penetration. Despite these trends, real interest rates and banking spreads in Brazil remain among the highest in the world (see Chart 11, Panels A and B). As at December 2013, spreads on non-earmarked credit amounted to 17.5 pp. A breakdown by type of borrower shows that interest rates charged on loans to households were higher (38% on average, with a spread of 26 pp), but the cost of credit for firms was also high ( 21% on average, with a spread of 11 pp). In contrast, earmarked credit had lower interest rates and, therefore, also lower spreads; as at December 2013, spreads for firms and households were 2.7 pp and 2.5 pp, respectively.
Several factors, related to the cost of credit, are behind the large banking margins on non-earmarked credit. That cost is affected by direct and indirect taxes, administrative burdens, contributions to the Fundo Garantidor de Crédito 9 -a deposit insurance fund -and reserve requirements on deposits. Accordingly, it may be said that the gap between the spreads of earmarked and non-earmarked credit is due, on the one hand, to a highly subsidised earmarked credit and, on the other, to an excessively penalised non-earmarked credit.
The central bank issues annual reports in this respect -see Banco Central do Brasil, "Juros e Spread Bancário no
Brasil" http://www.bcb.gov.br/?SPREAD. The decomposition presented is made using BCB methodology (2008), which offers certain improvements over previous research. 9. There were four indirect taxes on credit operations: two general, the PIS (social integration programme/civil servants assistance programme) and the COFINS (social contribution for social security financing); and two specific, the IOF (financial transaction tax) and the CPMF (temporary tax on financial transactions). Two direct taxes applied to the financial system: income tax (IR) and the social contribution on net profits (CSLL). Moreover, there were also compulsory contributions to the Fundo Garantidor de Crédito.
CHART 10: EVOLUTION OF INTEREST RATES AND BANKING SPREADS (NON-EARMARKED CREDIT)
Source: BCB. . This argument is supported by the fact that, in 2012, demand deposits were subject to a 44% unremunerated reserve requirement plus a 12% reserve requirement remunerated at the policy rate (the Selic rate, "sistema especial de liquidação e custodia").
For time deposits, the requirement amounted to 12%, and 30% for saving deposits, remunerated in both cases. Additionally, the existence of earmarked credit schemes to foster housing and rural investment also has an influence on banking spreads, since authorities require banks to lend a fraction of their deposits at subsidised interest rates. For instance, demand deposits are subject to a 29% requirement for funding rural and micro loans, roughly 20% of time deposits have to be invested in government securities, and savings deposits are subject to a 65% mortgage lending requirement. These investment requirements have effects similar to reserve requirements on financial intermediation: they increase the cost of nonearmarked credit as banks struggle to offset the impact on earnings. 10 In fact, under this 10. The system of earmarked credit mitigated market failures, but it also helped keep banking spreads high and perhaps crowded out the development of non-earmarked credit. system of bank requirements, only 15% of demand deposits, 68% of time deposits and 5% of savings deposits can be freely allocated at the banks' discretion.
High credit risk, explained by a number of institutional features of the Brazilian economy, is also identified as a relevant factor of large banking spreads. These include the drawbacks of an underdeveloped credit history register (mostly addressed by recent reforms, see below), which lacked information and increased ex ante credit risk, and the deficiencies of a slow legal system with a pro-debtor bias. These factors have traditionally contributed to create moral hazard, which has fed back into a higher risk premium. Moreover, deficiencies in the credit history register have helped create a captive market for banks and have increased interest rates. Credit risk has a straightforward effect on credit costs: it increases the risk premium and therefore the interest rate on loans. Lastly, according to the central bank's estimates, banks have enjoyed large profits, 
Implications for monetary, credit and macro-prudential policies
The law was finally approved by the Brazilian Parliament in 2011. In principal, the creation of a Positive
Credit Registry reduces the operational costs of risk management and, therefore, should also lead to a reduction in the cost of credit as good payers are identified by the registry. At the same time, banks may discriminate between good and bad debtors, i.e. credit scoring would be available, which may lower interest rates, and also increase loan maturities.
Monetary policy has been conducted with an inflation targeting regime since 1999. The official interest rate (Selic rate) is raised/lowered in order to tighten/ease monetary conditions and dampen inflation fluctuations and credit developments. The two features of the banking system previously discussed -segmentation and large banking spreads-have several farreaching implications for monetary policy management.
In a nutshell, standard monetary policy has only a partial impact on the financial system, specifically on the cost of non-earmarked credit, as earmarked credit is linked to the 11. The size of profits has to be taken with caution, as they are defined as the residual, i.e. the non-explained part of the spread, after deducting the effect of the other components. 12. Non-judicial foreclosure is possible if the mortgage was originated under a new contract called "alienaçao fiduiciária". This is a type of secured real estate transaction through which borrowers transfer the legal title of properties used as collateral to the trustee, who holds the property in trust for the use and benefit of the borrowers. If borrowers default on the terms of their loan, the trustee may take full control of the property and sell it without court proceedings. 13. Brazil already has a system for collecting and storing data on "bad creditors", i.e. credit information on borrowers who are delinquent in their payment obligations (for example, the databases managed by SPC Brazil and Serasa Experian).
"official" long-term interest rate (Taxa de Juros de Longo Plazo, TJLP) and, therefore, is not 
14.
A normative analysis of the growth of earmarked credit in recent years is complex, as it requires detailed information on market failures and their evolution over the cycle. The extensive activity of BNDES helped mitigate the risks of a credit crunch, but posed important risks in other dimensions. Similar caution is also advisable when analysing the programme to foster housing investment: it can help mitigate the housing shortage, but it also poses risks. Development banks and measures to foster credit to certain sectors have merits, as they can fill a gap in the market, but their activity also poses risks, and can prevent the development of the banking system, as they compete with commercial banks and may eventually crowd out their activity. 15. Nevertheless, as proposed by De Barros and Latif (2013), earmarked credit has been part of a broader rent-seeking scheme included in a government intervention project called "National Developmentalism" which itself introduces market failures. See Bielschowsky (1995) for a comprehensive explanation of the "National Developmentalism" idelology. traditional role of promoting investment was reinforced but, at the same time, the institution was used as a countercyclical policy instrument. In this sense, credit expansion by BNDES was instrumental in avoiding the risks of a credit crunch. More strikingly, BNDES' activity will remain strong after the recovery takes hold: according to budgetary plans, BNDES will be the major lender in infrastructure investment programmes in coming years.
Credit granted by BNDES is rationed, i.e. demand is higher than supply at the given price, fixed administratively. This implies that the authorities have an additional policy tool: the transfers made by the Treasury to BNDES. These transfers constitute an important policy tool, somewhere between fiscal and financial policy. The latter, because they determine credit conditions and have an important impact on credit (in this respect they have also become complementary to monetary policy). They are also akin to budgetary policy, because they require transfers from tax authorities and are therefore linked to fiscal policy. In fact, the 
B. BNDES disbursements
Disbursements difference between the subsidised interest rate and the funding cost of the Treasury is included in the calculation of the total fiscal balance.
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Earmarked credit also comprises some commercial banks' lending activities.
Commercial banks are subject to a number of administrative restrictions and have to invest 16. Public debt interest payments by the Treasury are accounted as fiscal spending in the calculation of the total fiscal balance. Nevertheless, in order to achieve more transparent and reliable fiscal accounts, the difference between the subsidised interest rates and the market interest rates -the real cost of the subsidised credit-should be entered as expenditure in the calculation of the primary balance, as that difference is actually a public transfer to the private sector through the banking system, which lends those funds at subsidised interest rates. Considering that the TJLP is currently 5% and the market Selic rate (a proxy of the funding cost of the Treasury) is 9%, a lower bound estimation of the fiscal cost of this credit policy would be around BRL 12 billion, i. As a consequence of all those developments market distortions remain, reflected in the increasing participation of public banks and earmarked credit in the loan portfolio of the banking system and in the existence of interest rate spreads between private and public banks. Whereas the first is correlated with the economic cycle (and the role of public credit as a countercyclical policy tool) and should moderate somewhat as economic growth takes hold (as seen in past episodes), the second seems to imply a public policy trying to reduce the high levels of interest rates. Although this is a desirable target, market dynamics, efficiency and competition are usually more robust drivers of interest rate reductions than policy intervention. Concluding remarks
The Brazilian economy has improved significantly in recent decades. Especially relevant are the improvements in its macroeconomic policy framework, which have allowed for greater economic stability and have made room for countercyclical policy management of crises.
After a challenging phase of institutional reforms initiated in the early 2000s, the public sector now displays primary fiscal surpluses and a reinforced commitment to fiscal discipline. Net debt has trended downward, driven by primary surpluses and GDP growth. And debt management has helped improve debt composition, making public finances less vulnerable:
the public debt structure is currently characterised by lower indexation, longer maturities and higher levels of international reserves. Thus, the traditional constraints imposed on macroeconomic policy by the public debt structure have largely been removed: the public sector has become a net creditor in foreign currency (helped at the same time by the huge accumulation of international reserves) and there is no negative effect of exchange rate depreciation on debt dynamics as there are no currency mismatches.
Regarding monetary policy, the inflation targeting regime introduced in 1999 has been successful in containing inflation, which has generally remained within the central bank's targets, and hyperinflation is no longer a risk. Nevertheless, the rate of inflation is still high compared to peers, possibly affected by supply-side constraints, excessive labour cost growth and low productivity.
Additionally, monetary policy is conducted within an atypical banking system which retains most of its traditional defining features. Credit allocation remains segmented. Indeed, direct credit provision by public banks has increased substantially in the wake of the global financial crisis. Accordingly, the short-term policy interest rate has a direct impact on only a fraction of total credit. Therefore, in order to correctly assess monetary policy, other quantitative measures, such as reserve requirements, must also be monitored. Banking spreads remain high by international standards, despite the efforts of the central bank to reduce them, and many of their traditional underlying determinants remain in place.
In any event, thanks to the lower vulnerabilities and increased credibility achieved in recent decades, Brazil was able to cope with a huge real and financial shock during the global economic and financial crisis. The leeway available for countercyclical policies in the wake of the global crisis suggests that the efforts made to pursue sound policies have paid off: the country remained resilient. However, major challenges remain, such as the drawbacks preventing growth potential from being unlocked, in particular the lack of infrastructure, the inadequate provision of public services and the challenge of increasing financial deepening to a level appropriate to the economic development of the country. This last factor is closely related to the functioning of the banking system and the high cost of non-earmarked credit.
While the behaviour of the Brazilian economy in the aftermath of the financial crisis has been notable, this has not prevented the recent build-up of economic and financial vulnerabilities, for instance, a widening current account deficit and the increase in nonfinancial corporations' foreign currency debt. The return of procyclical policies, that is, the need to conduct a restrictive monetary policy in recent years, against the backdrop of exchange rate depreciation and a slowing economy, is a timely reminder that the overall economic policy framework -in particular in the area of structural policies-still requires further improvement. 
